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Although the federal Clean Air Act was
drafted in 1954, the modern law dates
from the landmark 1970 amendments
which, for the first time, directly involved
the US government in the regulation of
air pollution. Mid-course corrections to
the 1970 law were enacted in 1977, and
one minor amendment dealing with the
steel industry became law in 1981. In
1990, however, the Congress passed a
sweeping, 328-page set of amendments
that affected virtually every major
provision of the 1970 law.
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(*the 1990 amendments') establish
radically new propositions as a matter of
federal law and repeal old, fundamental
and successful provisions. The
amendments hold out the promise of
achieving a great deal - healthful air by
certain times, local environments free
from the threat of toxic compounds,
lakes and forests shielded from acid rain,
and automotive tailpipes with still more
pollution wrung from them by the force
of federal law. What the amendments
deliver is vastly less, and markedly
different, from what they promise.
Tension between protection of the
environment and public health on the one
hand and considerations of cost and
convenience on the other are common in
environmental decision-making. The
1970 Clean Air Act Amendments ("the
Act")1 resolved that tension in favor of
protection of health and the environment,
forcing changes in technology and
behavior where necessary. The principal
author of the 1970 amendments, Sen.
Edward S. Muskie, said as the Senate
began consideration of the proposals:
The first responsibility of Congress Is
not the making of technological or
economic judgments - or even to be
limited by what is or appears to be
technologically or economically
feasible. Our responsibility is to
establish what the public interest
requires to protect the health of
persons. This may mean that people
and industries will be asked to do what
seems to be impossible at the present
time. But if health is to be protected,
these challenges must be met. I am
convinced they can be met.
2
In contrast, the 1990 amendments
resolve the tension between protection
and costs and convenience In favor of
the latter, with the result that alleged
limits of technology constrain the level
of protection.
Thus, the law as altered by the 1990
amendments is a significantly different
creature from the 1970 Act. After
amendment, protection of human health
has all but ceased to be the basis of the
law; deadlines for achieving air quality
goals have been set well into the next
century (and even then will be
automatically extended with minimal
penalty), and technology-forcing
provisions have been repealed or
forsaken. Yet these changes are
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apparent only upon a close reading of the
law, for rarely are they accomplished in
an obvious way.
This article does not attempt a
comprehensive analysis of the 1990
amendments. Rather, it examines a
limited number of the most far-reaching
changes to illustrate the radically new
direction in which the Congress has
embarked.
THE 1970 CLEAN AIR ACT
Sen. Muskie, who chaired the US
Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution, described the Act as one that
was shaped by "three fundamental
principles":
" Protection of public health;
" Application of the best technology
available for the abatement of air
pollution; and
* Deadlines for the attainment of
health-related air quality levels.'
"The success or failure of the program
would be determined by measurement
against these criteria," he later said.4 As
the 101st Congress began the process of
drafting amendments in 1989, it seemed
clear to some that if the nation's air
pollution program were measured against
Muskie's criteria, it likely would be
judged an incomplete success.
A. Health Standards
According to 1983-85 data (the most
recent available in early 1989), seventy-
six areas were in violation of the health-
based ozone standard.6  About 130
million Americans lived in these areas.8
Although critics of the Clean Air Act
were fond of discounting the effects of
ozone and other air pollutants by referring
to them as mere "irritants," a steadily
mounting body of evidence suggested
that the damages were serious and long-
lasting.
Repeated statistical analyses of air
pollution data correlated pollutant
concentrations with excess mortality and
morbidity. The annual death toll
attributable to air pollution was estimated
to be between two and five percent of all
mortalities per year.7 In other tests
where healthy, non-smoking adults were
exposed to air pollution concentrations
comparable to those encountered in the
ambient air while exercising, they
experienced short-term changes in lung
function and increased respiratory
symptoms. These ranged from pain
when breathing to shortness of breath.8
In other laboratory studies, animals
forced to breathe ozone-polluted air over
long periods of time contracted a variety
of biochemical and structural injuries to
the lungs. These included decreased
elasticity, increased numbers of airway
lesions, and loss of cilia as well as other
changes in ciliated cells."
Despite this accumulating burden of
evidence, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") failed to promulgate
newer, more stringent ambient standards
for either ozone or the other pollutants
incriminated by the studies.
B. Technology
By 1988, federally imposed pollution
control standards, which supposedly
reflected state-of-the-art controls, lagged
far behind what was commercially
available with respect to both stationary
sources (e.g., power plants) and mobile
sources (e.g., cars and trucks). For
example, power plants operating in other
nations such as Germany are subject to
- and achieve in practice - pollution
limits much more stringent than those
presently required under U.S. law."
C. Deadlines
The deadline for meeting the federal
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law's health-based standards was
December 31, 1982, although extensions
to December 31, 1987 had been allowed
for some areas. To qualify, areas
burdened by severe auto pollution
problems were required to adopt
stringent and focused control programs
such as inspection and maintenance
(I&M") for vehicles." The vast
majority of non-attainment areas had
sought and received such extensions but
still failed to attain the standards by the
1987 deadline. By 1989, it was widely
conceded that most areas would require
several additional years to meet the
standards and some, such as Southern
California, might need another quarter-
century to meet health-based standards.
Still, viewed from the perspective of
1970, there had been vast improvements
by 1988, especially with respect to the
control of automotive emissions. By
1988, Americans were driving nearly one
trillion more miles per year than in
1970.12 Despite this massive increase
in vehicle miles travelled - and
notwithstanding the fact that a large
number of cities still violated the ozone
standard - the quality of the air in
American urban areas had improved.
Violations of the health-based standards
had declined markedly in frequency and
-severity. 3  New power plants were
regularly equipped with pollution control
devices capable of eliminating ninety
percent or more of the sulfur dioxide and
other pollutants."4 Consumption of
leaded gasoline had declined sharply and,
with it, the levels of lead found in the
blood of Americans.1
It was in this context of incomplete
success that the Congress, with the
active involvement of the President,
undertook amending the Clean Air Act.
When the process finally concluded two
years later, the result was widely hailed
as landmark legislation, "one of the most
comprehensive and sweeping
environmental laws that Congress has
passed this century."'"
THE 1990 AMENDMENTS
At 328 pages, the 1990 amendments
to the Clean Air Act surpass In
complexity and detail all previous
environmental enactments. The
amendments are widely thought to have
strengthened the law substantially,
especially with respect to the control of
acid deposition and precursor pollutants.
However, closer examination suggests
that the amendments are a far-reaching
and fundamental retrenchment from the
stringency of the 1970 law, both in
particular provisions and in the
aggregate.
As mentioned, Muskie's three
yardsticks for measuring the success of
the 1970 amendments were protection of
public health, technology-forcing
provisions, and deadlines for the
attainment of health-related air quality
levels. Another requirement allowed
extensions of deadlines or other
significant changes to be granted only by
the Congress because it was the only
branch of government politically
accountable. The 1990 amendments
retreated from, and arguably abandoned,
all of those fundamental principles.
One change, perhaps above all others,
illustrates the attitude taken by the 101st
Congress toward the protection of human
health and environment. Twenty years
earlier, environmental threats had been
both less menacing and less imminent.
Ozone destruction was not an issue.
Global warming was a distant and
speculative danger, if that. The air
pollution toll in terms of human sickness
and death had been qualitatively
established, but poorly quantified. Thus,
it was perhaps unsurprising that
Congress failed to act on proposals that
would have established a right to a
healthy and safe environment."
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But by 1990, the damages were
neither speculative nor distant. Congress
began the process of amending the Clean
Air Act at a time of intense public alarm
over stratospheric ozone depletion, global
warming, urban smog, acid deposition
and a seemingly endless list of threats to
humanity's survival - most of them
posed by air pollution."8 Smog levels
were the worst in a decade,'9 average
global temperatures were the highest
ever recorded, 0 and even the chemical
industry was conceding that the cause of
an ozone *hole" as large as North
America and as high as Mt. Everest was
pollution, namely, a family of chemicals
known as chlorofluorocarbons or
CFCs."' George Bush had been elected
president at least in part because of his
self-declared position as an
"environmentalist,"' and Democrats 
-
widely perceived to be the political party
most committed to protection of the
environment - controlled both houses of
Congress.
In short, never had the circumstances
seemed more likely to support a political
consensus in favor of enactment of a
right to be free of pollution. And, indeed,
Congress did enact a right. But it was
not a right for victims. It was instead a
right for polluters - a right, quite
literally, to pollute.2 3
It will be left to the courts to define the
nature and extent of this new right.
Perhaps it will prove to be an individual
liberty, joining in the ranks of freedom of
speech and press. Or it may be a
property right protected from regulatory
takings without compensation and due
process. Or, although it seems unlikely,
it may prove to be merely an empty word
that conveys nothing of real value to
polluters. Whatever the right is,
however, it is clear that there is one thing
that it is not: additional protection for the
public.
I. TITLE I: NONATTAINMENT AREAS
A. "Deadlines" and Sanctions
1. "Deadlines"
The 1970 Act required areas to
meet the health-based standards by
specified dates.2 ' Penalties, which
were imposed both for failure to attain 2
and failure to try, provided an incentive
for areas to actually meet the standards
by the prescribed dates. Thus, under the
1970 Act, deadlines28 and sanctions
were tightly coupled tools focused on
protecting human health.
The deadlines of the 1970 Act and the
1977 amendments were unambiguous:
national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS") were to be met by December
31, 1982. Areas which adopted control
programs, such as an I&M system for
motor vehicles, could be granted an
extension to December 31, 1987, for
attainment of the ozone and carbon
monoxide standards.27  The sanctions
- focused on attainment - ranged from
a loss of federal highway funding2 8 to
bans on the construction of new
sources. 
2
The 1990 amendments appear to have
merely extended the attainment dates for
areas as outlined in Table 120 In reality
there is no longer any fixed date by
which the standards must be met
because the 1990 amendments create a
series of self-extending attainment dates.
The mechanism is rather complex but
quite ingenious.
The attainment date set by section
172(a)(2) is "the date by which
attainment can be achieved as
expeditiously as practicable, but no later
than five years from the date such area
was designated nonattainment under
section 107(d), except that the
Administrator may extend the attainment
date . . . for a period no greater than ten
years ... ."I' Thus, the law appears to
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establish a firm deadline. This impression
is confirmed by Congressional statements
to that effect. For example, the Senate
Committee described the program as
follows:
Depending on the severity of the
pollution problem, nonattainment areas
for any of the pollutants must attain
the health standard within (the
specified number of years) for ozone.32
However, an area failing to attain the
standard by the applicable date is subject
to section 179(d), "Consequences for
Failure to Attain." Paragraph (1) of that
section requires a revision of the area's
nonattainment plan to reflect the reality
of continued nonattainment. One of the
"consequences" is described in paragraph
(3), which provides that:
(3) The attainment date. applicable to
the revision required under paragraph
(1) shall be the same as provided in the
provisions of section 172(a)(2), except
that in applying such provisions the
phrase "from the date of the notice
under section 179(c)(2)" shall be
substituted for the phrase "from the
date such area was designated
nonattainment under section 107(d)"
and for the phrase "from the date of
designation as nonattainment. " "
Thus, for areas failing to meet their
deadlines, section 172(a)(2), with the
substitutions required by section
179(d)(3), reads as follows:
(2) Attainment dates for nonattainment
areas
(A) The attainment date for an
area designated nonattainment
with respect to a national primary
ambient air quality standard shall
be the date by which attainment
can be achieved as expeditiously
as practicable, but no later than
five years from the date of the
notice under section 179(c)(2),
except that the Administrator
may extend the attainment date
to the extent the Administrator
determines appropriate, for a
period of no greater than ten
years from the date of the notice
under section 179(c)(2),
considering the severity of
nonattainment and the availability
and feasibility of pollution control
measures24
Because the number of such automatic
extensions is unlimited, there is never a
fixed date by which the public can be
assured the air will meet the health-based
standards. Moreover, because the
attainment date is based on the
"availability and feasibility of pollution
control measures," it will always follow,
rather than lead, technology. So, there is
little hope that the "deadlines" will
encourage the development or adoption
of new control systems comparable to
catalytic converters or "scrubbers. " "
After reviewing the self-extension
provisions, one reaches a harsh but
inescapable conclusion: deadlines -
defined by the Oxford English Dictionary
as "a line that does not move" - for
attainment have now ceased to exist.
2. Sanctions
The 1990 amendments not only
eliminated enforceable deadlines for
achieving healthy air, but they also
repealed the 1970 sanctions. Although
new sanctions were provided, they are
discretionary and focused on planning for
attainment, not attainment itself.
For example, section 176 of the 1970
Act mandated the imposition of a
moratorium on federal funding for
highways as well as for state and local
air pollution control programs."6 The
1990 amendments, however, repealed
the ban on air grants altogether, and the
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ban on highway funding became subject
to the discretion not only of the EPA
Administrator, but also the Secretary of
Transportation as well. 7
The new amendments do provide a
limited number of sanctions, but they are
of doubtful utility. Sources of volatile
organic compounds ("VOCs") in "severe"
or "extreme" nonattainment areas,3 B for
example, are subject to a potential fee of
$5,000 per ton for excess emissions.
However, calculating the fee is complex
and thus susceptible to evasion. Also,
the fee is most likely a deductible
business expense since it is not a
penalty. Most importantly, $5,000 per
ton is substantially less than the cost of
pollution controls, which can already
range up to $39,100 per ton in areas
such as Los Angeles.39 Thus, from the
perspective of some companies, non-
attainment may be a cost-effective
business strategy.
In summary, the 1990 amendments
repealed both deadlines and sanctions as
they existed in the 1970 Act, replacing
them with a succession of "attainment
dates" that lie in the distant future,
uncertain of achievement even then.
II. TITLE II: MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS
It is in the regulation of emissions from
mobile sources - principally cars - that
the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air
Act most clearly and unequivocally
embraced the concept of forcing
technological development in order to
protect human health. It is in the 1990
amendments to these same provisions
that the Congress most clearly
abandoned those same principles.
A. The 1970 Act
In 1970, the opponents of the mobile
source provisions contended that the
proposed standards were impossible to
meet with the technologies then
available. In a letter to Sen. Muskie, the
president of General Motors said:
General Motors does not at this time
know how to get production vehicles
down to the emission levels that your
bill would require for 1975 models.
Accomplishment of these goals, as far
as we know, simply is not
technologically possible within the time
frame required.' 0
This refrain was repeated by one of the
chief defenders of the auto industry, Sen.
Robert Griffin (R-MI), who contended
during a Senate debate that, "Ithe
technology for achieving the standards
set in legislative concrete by this bill are
(sic) not available." 4
One of the reasons for Griffin's ire was
that the 1970 amendments were
themselves a radical departure from
previous law. Pre-1970 federal
requirements - like those of 1990 and
beyond - followed technological
developments rather than forcing
them."2  By 1970, however, it was
clear that such an approach was failing
to yield the pollution reductions
necessary to protect public health. Nor
did it seem likely that the technologies
then available to the auto industry would
lead to healthful air at. any time in the
near future. Thus, Muskie and his
colleagues were forced to choose
between protecting public health - and
requiring standards that the industry
contended were impossible to meet - or
maintaining the status quo. They
rejected continued reliance on an
approach that based emissions standards
on their supposed technological
feasibility, choosing instead to protect
health:
Wle have learned that tests of
economic and technological feasibility
applied to those [emissions] standards
compromise the health of our people
and lead to inadequate standards.'
Ultimately, although the Congress later
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relaxed the deadline and one of the three
emission limits contained in the 1970
Act, the auto industry did in fact meet
the standards mandated by the 1970
law." Since then, tailpipe programs
have been adopted by virtually all of the
world's industrialized nations. Still by
1985, roughly thirty-three percent of US
emissions of oxides of nitrogen ("NOx")
and forty to forty-five percent of VOCs,
the two principal precursors of ozone,
came from motor vehicles.46 Moreover,
roughly half of all Americans lived in
areas that had failed to attain the health-
based standards mandated by the 1970
amendments. Thus, in 1989-90, the
Congress was faced with essentially the
same choice as in 1970: protecting
public health - by requiring standards
that the industry contended were
impossible to meet - or maintaining the
status quo. This time, the Congress
opted for the latter.
No doubt the 101st Congress yielded
to industry complaints partially because
of the pessimistic view of some analysts
who suggested that air pollution in the
United States was such an intractable
problem that anything short of draconian
measures would fail to yield immediate
progress. For example, the Office of
Technology Assessment concluded that,
[I]n the worst areas, even the most
costly and stringent of available
measures will not lower emission levels
sufficiently to meet the standard.
Achieving that goal is a long-range
project, well beyond the 5- and 10-year
horizons of existing law. It will require
both new technologies and lifestyle
changes .,. 46
Still, there was widespread agreement
that the 1970 strategy had indeed
succeeded in forcing the development of
pollution control technology, with the
House Energy and Commerce Committee
Report in 1990 declaring that "[t]he
theory worked." 47 Yet the Committee,
and ultimately the Congress and
President, adopted a program that
abandoned the strategy.
B. The 1990 Amendments
The 1990 Amendments take a two-
tiered approach to conventional auto and
light truck emission standards. In
formulating Tier I, Congress essentially
adopted the program then in place in
California, albeit on a delayed schedule:
phasing in vehicle certification 4
requirements between model years 1994
and 1996; establishing a less stringent
"interim" certification standard by
extending the certification period to
100,000 miles; and phasing out the
interim standard between 1996 and
1998, while limiting recall testing to
75,000 miles.
These Tier I provisions radically alter
the approach of the 1970 Act. First, by
following the California standards, the
federal law abandons the "technology
forcing" concept. Second, by
establishing a differential standard for
certification and in-use requirements, the
1990 law delays even the application of
existing technology, thus eroding the
concept that the standards are based on
public health protection. Third, the 1990
Act establishes a legal precedent that
vehicles in use need not meet new-car
certification standards.
Although Tier I delivers a debilitating
blow, it is Tier II of the 1990
amendments that inflicts the greater
damage to the concepts that animated
the 1970 law. Although in Tier II
"pending" emission standards for light
duty vehicles are supposedly set at fifty
percent of the Tier I level, there Is, once
again, less to the new law than meets
the eye.
The term "pending emission
standards,"" used to refer to the Tier II
limits, suggests that they might go into
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effect at any time. This impression
seems to be confirmed by the Statement
of Managers, implying a certain
inevitability to the Tier I1 standards:
An additional reduction in auto
emissions - a 50 percent cut below
the standards required in the mid-
1990's - would be required after
2003 unless EPA finds that this new
standard is not necessary,
technologically feasible, or cost
effective. 0
But little is inevitable about the Tier II
standards. While some observers may
attach a certain symbolic importance to
their inclusion in the amendments, the
only circumstance under which they
would necessarily go into effect is if the
Administrator of EPA failed to act."1
Thus, the sole legal role of the Tier II
standards is as a "hammer"; it is to be
imposed if - and only if - the
Administrator fails to take certain
prescribed actions.
The presence of the Tier II standards in
the statutory language has been cited by
some as evidence of Congressional
commitment to future tightening of
automotive emission limits. To some
degree this is true, yet the Tier II
numbers are merely one of a potentially
infinite variety of standards that are more
stringent than Tier I. The law requires
that these other options be examined; the
Administrator must "consider other
standards . . which are more stringent
or less stringent ... ."12 It is possible
that the Administrator could opt to
promulgate the Tier II standards, but not
because of their presence in the law.
Indeed, the amendments expressly bar
any preference in favor of the Tier 11
standards:
Nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed by the Administrator or by a
court as a presumption that any
standards (or useful life period) set
forth in Table 3 shall be promulgated in
the rule-making required under this
paragraph.
6 3
The question that then arises is
whether, and under what circumstances,
emission limits more stringent than those
under Tier I might be imposed. Under the
1970 Act, the answer to this question
was clear: the Administrator was
authorized under section 202(a)(1) to
promulgate tighter emission standards if
they were required to protect the public
health or welfare."
New section 203 appears to leave
202(a)(1) intact; in fact, however, it
turns the old law on its head. Tighter
standards - which could have been
issued under the old law solely on the
basis of protection of human health -
are now flatly forbidden prior to the year
2003. Even in 2003 and beyond, before
tighter standards can be promulgated, the
Administrator must affirmatively satisfy
several legal requirements, as follows:
If the Administrator determines . . .
that . . . there is no need [or that]...
the technology ... will not be available
[or that] ... further reductions will not
be needed or cost effective . . . the
Administrator shall not promulgate
more stringent standards .... 6
Thus, what was an affirmative grant of
power for protection of human health
under the 1970 Act has been remolded
by the 1990 amendments into a
constraint on further controls - even if
human health suffers because of it.
If states such as California can reduce
emissions adequately through adoption of
their own tailpipe standards using the
section 209 waiver provisions, then
tightened federal emission limits are
prohibited68  Alternatively, if the
technology for meeting tighter standards
is unavailable, then tighter federal
standards are prohibited. Furthermore,
"availability" is not just a function of
technological achievability, but also "the
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lead time and safety and energy impacts
of meeting more stringent emission
standards.""' Finally, if alternative
means of attaining or maintaining the
ambient standards - more stringent
requirements on consumer products or
stationary sources, for example - are
available and cost effective, then federal
standards tighter than Tier I are
affirmatively prohibited.5"
If the emission limits enacted by the
1970 Act had been measured against
these litmus tests of the 1990
amendments, they would never have
been adopted. 9 Nor would the Tier I
requirements contained in the 1990
amendments have been adopted.60
Inconvenience for a single industry and
incremental cost increases on an already
expensive product are but two of many
competing considerations in deciding the
best societal method of curbing air
pollution. Yet under the 1990
amendments, a statutory citadel is
erected around the auto industry. To
scale it will require lengthy, complex and
expensive studies and rule-makings.
Tailpipes arguably become the control of
last resort.
Given the substantial emissions
reductions that have already been
achieved on a per-vehicle-mile basis since
1970, a legitimate argument can be
made that stationary sources and fuels
should share more of the responsibility
for curbing air pollution. But to
implement such a policy would require an
affirmative, aggressive program to reduce
emissions from stationary sources.
Unfortunately, such a program does not
,exist.
When Congress began serious
discussion of strengthening amendments
to the Clean Air Act in 1987, a menu of
additional federal controls was identified,
ranging from emission limits on bakeries
to mandated ride-sharing.6' Yet, one
after another, each of the proposals fell
by the legislative wayside - as did
statutory Tier II emission limits.
Conventional cars are now, as they
were in 1970, collectively the largest
single source of air pollution in the United
States. That was the reason they were
singled out for explicit, detailed treatment
by the 1970 Act. The 1990
amendments reversed that priority,
shifting the burden away from autos and
toward every other source - or, given
the elimination of deadlines and
meaningful sanctions, onto the shoulders
of innocent victims whose sole
connection with air pollution is that they
are forced to breathe it.
From this discussion, one might
assume that vehicle emission control
technology is pushed to its limits by the
Tier I standards, and that achieving
standards as stringent as Tier II is highly
speculative and fraught with great
technical challenge. To the contrary, the
Tier I standards are at best a modest -
and delayed - improvement. Indeed,
even Tier II standards may be laughably
outdated by 2006.2
By comparison, the California Air
Resources Board adopted a regulation
that requires every auto manufacturer
wishing to operate in California to offer
for sale at least two percent Zero
Emission Vehicles ("ZEV") in 1998, and
ten percent in 2003. This has proved a
powerful incentive for manufacturers;
literally dozens of ZEV development
programs are under way worldwide.
Ill. OTHER TITLE II PROVISIONS
Several other Title II provisions that
arguably diminish the requirements or
philosophy of the 1970 Act are worthy of
mention.
A. Non-Road Engines
The 1990 amendments repeal existing
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law and limit California regulation of so-
called "non-road" engines. These
engines, which are currently regulated by
neither state nor federal governments,
are put to a variety of uses ranging from
generating electric power to operating
compressors. Because they have no
pollution controls, a single non-road
engine can produce 100 times the
pollution of a comparable car or truck
engine. Section 222(b) of the 1990
amendments adds a new section 213 and
modifies section 209 to preempt state
regulation of engines smaller than 175
horsepower and confer exclusive control
on the federal government. The EPA
Administrator is granted the authority,
but not the duty, to regulate these
engines following a study. California may
regulate larger engines upon EPA's
approval.
B. Evaporative Emissions
The Administrator is given a
"mandate" without a deadline to control
evaporative emissions; the provision
requires the greatest level of control
"reasonably available" considering cost,
energy and safety factors.
C. Consumer Warranty
Auto manufacturers must warrant
that cars will pass inspection and
maintenance requirements for five years
or 50,000 miles if they are properly
maintained. Prior to the 1990
amendments, emission control parts that
failed within the period were replaced
free of charge. The 1990 amendments
roll back to two years/24,000 miles the
consumer warranty for parts other than
the on-board computer and catalytic
converter. The amendments require an
eight-year/80,000 mile warranty for the
latter parts.
D. Motor Vehicle Air Toxics
By mid-1 995, the Administrator is to
promulgate "reasonable" requirements,
considering cost, availability, noise,
energy, safety factors and lead time.
E. Clean Fuels
The House rationalized repeal of the
technology forcing program for passenger
cars by pointing to an expanded "Clean
Fuel Fleet Vehicle" program and the
"California Pilot Program," which
mandate the sale of clean fuel vehicles in
Los Angeles. The pilot program would
become effective as a matter of federal
law only if California fails to adopt its
own program within four years. The
clean fuel fleet program standards and
enforcement provisions are subject to
modification to conform them to
California's standards. The program is
limited to nine cities and to certain types
of fleets and would not begin to be
phased in until 1998. In short, these
provisions, too, are written to force the
federal program to follow California's.
Even with its limitations, if the program
fulfills the expectations of its proponents,
it will positively affect air quality for a
large portion of the population exposed to
violations of the health-based standards.
Moreover, the program is directed at
improving air quality in the region where
it is the worst: Southern California.
Finally, it focuses federal attention on a
significant source of air pollution -
motor vehicle fuels - that had been
largely unregulated.
F. Conclusion
There are some provisions in the 1990
amendments that require emissions limits
more stringent than those achievable
with the technology available in 1990.3
Nevertheless, the amendments on
balance embrace the approach that had
failed twenty years earlier: namely, the
setting of emissions standards on the
basis of technological and economic
considerations rather than on the basis of
protection of health. This action was all
the more inexplicable because the
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program adopted in 1970 had been a
manifest, widely admired, and emulated
success. Ironically, California's
requirement that manufacturers offer for
sale cars that emit zero tailpipe pollution
has spurred a torrent of technological
innovation."
IV. TITLE Ill: HAZARDOUS AIR
POLLUTANTS
The fifty-five pages of amendments
dealing with toxic or "hazardous" air
pollutants are among the most complex
set of changes contained in the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. Yet their
ultimate effect is quite simple: the
program contained in the 1970 law -
which many saw as so zealously
protective of human health that it was
roundly condemned for nearly twenty
years as being inflexible and unworkable
- has been replaced by one which
establishes standards based on cost to
industry.
The new law retains the mandate of
the old law: to set standards at a level
that provides "an ample margin of safety
to protect human health." This language
appears to retain administrative discretion
to set standards at a level deemed
protective of health. The difference is
that under the old law, this language was
widely viewed as requiring zero emissions
of some chemicals, even if that meant
shutting down a plant. When studies
provided inconclusive results, the
Administrator was to err on the side of
caution. Moreover, the new statute must
be seen through the lens of three
Reagan-Bush Executive Orders that
predate the 1990 amendments and
effectively compel the EPA Administrator
to err on the side most favorable to
industry, regardless of the risks to human
health. Under the amendments, that
same language now clearly allows
pollution-caused risks of death so high
that they rival the threats posed by dying
in a car crash or a household accident.
The transformation of a law that was
regarded as inflexible in the extreme Into
one that is more nearly the opposite -
without any change whatsoever In the
language of the health standard - is one
of the more complex tales associated
with the 1990 amendments.
A. The 1970 Act
Under section 112 of the 1970 Act,
the Administrator was required to list
hazardous air pollutants, defined as those
"to which no ambient air quality standard
is applicable and which in the judgment
of the Administrator may cause, or
contribute to, an increase in mortality or
an increase in serious irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness.""6
Within 180 days of listing a pollutant,
the Administrator was to publish
proposed emission standards for sources
emitting the pollutant and provide for a
public hearing within thirty days. Within
another 180 days, final regulations were
to be promulgated, unless, based on the
hearing, the Administrator determined
that the pollutant was not hazardous.68
The standard was to be set at a level that
provided "an ample margin of safety to
protect public health." 7
For pollutants for which there Is no
known threshold, or safe level, it was
widely believed that the language of
section 112 might require an emissions
limit of zero. This, in turn, might require
some plants to shut down because It
would be impossible to continue
operating without producing any
emissions whatsoever.'
Implementation of the provisions of
section 112 proved thoroughly
unsatisfactory to virtually all concerned.
Public interest groups complained that
during twenty years only eight pollutants
had been regulated as hazardous."
EPA officials, however, blamed the law,
saying the Agency had been "severely
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constrained by an unsatisfactory
statute." The Administrator called for a
program of "best technology standards"
for the regulation of hazardous air
pollutants.70 In 1990 Congress obliged.
B. The 1990 Amendments
Title III of the 1990 amendments
consists of six sections. The first,
section 301, replaces section 112 and
consists of new subsections (a) through
(r) addressing a wide variety of subjects,
ranging from the basic regulatory
mechanisms to the prevention of
accidental releases.71
The heart of Title III, however, is the
new regulatory program of section 301.
It requires the establishment of industry-
by-industry standards based on existing
technology.72  It also establishes a
"residual risk" program, supposedly
designed to protect human health when
technology-based standards do not.
1. Technology Based Standards
The 1990 amendments have been
widely billed as requiring "maximum
achievable control technology"7
("MACT"). Yet the technology required
is not, in fact, that which will achieve the
"maximum achievable" reduction, but
rather a technology that
takels] into consideration the cost of
achieving such emission reduction, and
any non-air quality health and
environmental impacts and energy
requirements .... 74
The new technology-based regulatory
system is modelled after section 307 of
the Clean Water Act, which requires
sources of specifically enumerated toxic
water pollutants to install the "best
available technology ("BAT*)
economically achievable for the
applicable category or class of point
sources."78 Although the Clean Water
Act's BAT program was held out as a
model for the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act, section 307 has been an
incomplete success itself. As of early
1992, one-half of the industrial
categories subject to section 307 were
not covered by standards. 71
Because they require that a standard
be set on the basis of existing
technologies, the 1990 amendments
cannot force the development of new
ones. The question, then, is just how lax
the technology-based standards will be.
To reduce the chance of basing a
standard on the lowest common
denominator, 7' the new law requires
MACT to be based on "the best
performing twelve percent of the existing
sources." But even this gesture towards
technology-forcing is undercut by
.excluding those sources" from the
averaging process which are the newest
and cleanest.
78
2. Residual Risk Protection
Those fearful that such lax
technology requirements might lead to
minimal regulation of carcinogens,
neurotoxins, and other hazardous air
pollutants might be assured by section
112(f), "Standard to Protect Health and
the Environment." By its very words,
this section seems to require regulatory
"standards . . . to provide an ample
margin of safety to protect public health
.... ."1 Once again, the amendments
deliver less than they seem to promise.
This is due in part to the confusion
created by the decision of the DC Court
of Appeals in Natural Resources Defense
Council v Environmental Protection
Agency, often referred to as the Vinyl
Chloride decision."0
Section 112 of the 1970 Act required
EPA to set standards for hazardous air
pollutants at the level that provides "an
ample margin of safety to protect public
health." This language seems on its face
to preclude the consideration of factors
other than protection of human health in
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the setting of a standard. EPA, however,
disagreed81 and in proposing regulation
of vinyl chloride - a potent cancer-
causing chemical - declined to require
installation of the best available control
technology. The NRDC filed suit,
bringing the issue before the DC Court of
Appeals.
The court sitting en banc rendered a
decision that effectively endorsed EPA's
view that section 112 was not a zero-risk
law (even though the Vinyl Chloride
decision itself was remanded). The court
held that in setting standards for
pollutants that have no known threshold
for adverse effect (e.g., carcinogens), the
agency was required to follow a two-step
process. The first step was to determine
a "safe" level of emissions, while the
second was to calculate a margin of
safety.
*Safe," however, did not mean risk-
free. On the contrary, said the court, a
"safe" level was based on "what risks are
acceptable in the world in which we
live.""2 The court's view is a far cry
from that expressed seventeen years
earlier by Sen. Muskie.
Having determined an "acceptable"
risk, the Administrator was then required
to establish a margin of safety. In
establishing the margin of safety, said the
court, the Administrator "may, and
perhaps must take into account the
inherent limitations of risk assessment
and the limited scientific knowledge...
and may therefore, decide to set the level
below that previously determined to be
safe." 3
The court's decision was clearly at
odds with the widespread, long-held view
that section 112 mandated zero or
something close to it. True, it was
possible after the decision to argue that
the law still required protection of public
health. But to many observers, the
meaning of that term was much different
from the one assigned by the court.
We will never know whether the DC
Circuit's construction of the law would
have been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Similarly, we will never know whether
this construction would have been
mandated by an administration that took
a different view of the law - a view that
might have been accorded some
deference pursuant to the accepted rules
of statutory construction. It appears that
Congress adopted the construction of the
DC Court of Appeals and affirmatively
enacted it.64
To appreciate the consequences of
Vinyl Chloride, however, it is necessary
to review three Reagan-Bush executive
orders, because they effectively dictate
many of the decisions which must be
made at EPA. Implementation of the
1990 amendments, and all other federal
regulatory statutes must be read with the
overlay of these three Executive Orders,
EO 12291,6 EO 12498," and EO
12630. 8 7 Taken together, these Orders
compel the executive branch officials,
including the Administrator of EPA, to
consider minimizing costs to the polluter
when promulgating standards.
3. Executive Order 12291
EO 12291, which President Ronald
Reagan issued one month after taking
office, requires every federal agency to
forward all proposed and final regulations
to the White House's Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") for
review. The agency may not issue the
final regulations until it responds to
OMB's comments. "Major" rules - that
is, those with an economic impact
greater than $100 million - must be
accompanied by a detailed regulatory
impact analysis.
For its part, OMB is required to assure
that each regulation maximizes
"aggregate net benefits to society." In
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the case of laws, such as the former
section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which
required that standards be based solely
on protection of human health, OMB
could exercise only limited powers.
However, the repeal of the old standards,
coupled with enactment of a new section
112 by the 1990 amendments, now
assures that future regulations will, like
virtually all others, be subject to OMB
review and revision.
4. Executive Order 12498
EQ 12498, which President Reagan
issued as he was about to begin his
second term in office, requires that all
agency decisions be "consistent with the
Administration's regulatory principles."
Proposed rules must be submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget,
where they are "reviewed . . . for
consistency."
Although the expressed purpose of the
EO is for "planning," proposed rules
clearly are subjected to substantive
review, and those that are inconsistent
with Administration policy may not be
published. For example, in its first
submission to OMB under EQ 12498,
EPA listed eighty-five rules or
regulations."8 Several of these related
to the development or promulgation of
NAAQS. According to law, NAAQS are
to be based solely on protection of
human health and, therefore, should be in
principle immune from review for
"consistency' with any policy other than
protection of health. 9 Because OMB is
not subject to most of the "sunshine"
disclosure requirements of federal laws,
what happens to proposed rules and
regulations once they get to OMB is
unclear. All we know is that they are
never issued; no new primary NAAQS
have been promulgated since the PM 10
standard in 1986. A statement made by
former Chief of Staff John Daniels sheds
some light on OMB's methodology. He
stated that during the consideration of
one NAAQS revision, OMB "kept urging
upon us consideration of the costs
through certain types of analyses that
really were not permitted in terms of
making the ultimate decision under the
statute."
9 0
5. Executive Order 12630
President Reagan signed EO 12630,
entitled "Government Actions and
Interference With Constitutionally
Protected Property Rights," during his
last year in office. Its stated purpose is to
assure that federal agencies act with
"due regard for the constitutional
protection [of private property] provided
by the Fifth Amendment."9 ' In cases
where the Executive Order is applicable,
agencies are instructed:
Actions to which this order applies are
asserted to be for the protection of
public health and safety, therefore,
should be undertaken only in response
to real and substantial threats to public
health and safety, be designed to
advance significantly the health and
safety purpose, and be no greater than
is necessary to achieve the health and
safety purpose.9
2
Perhaps no single one of these three
orders would, on its face, impede timely
implementation of section 112 as a
program based solely on protection of
human health. In the aggregate,
however, the three orders have, at the
very least, a chilling effect on attempts to
implement the new law as a health-
based-only statute. Regardless of their
theoretical effects, the practical
consequence of these regulations,
especially when read with the Statement
of Managers, is to eliminate protection of
human health as the sole predicate of
section 112.
6. Other Provisions Contained in the
1990 Amendments
Subsection (a) of section 112
defines a number of terms used
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throughout the hazardous air pollutant
provisions. Some of the definitions, such
as that of a "major source," are central to
the operation of the entire title.9 3 Other
definitions, however, are predicates for
special interest provisions. For example,
the section contains a definition of
"electric utility steam generating unit"94
for the purpose of exempting these
facilities from regulation, even though
they are known to emit significant
quantities of toxic compounds ranging
from cadmium to mercury.", The title
focuses on two different sources of
poisonous compounds: large, fixed
installations such as refineries, printing
plants and smelters, which are termed
"major source," and numerous, smaller
shops such as dry cleaners and auto
body shops, which are termed "area
sources."
Section 112(b) currently lists 189
"hazardous" air pollutants. 8 The list
contains some anomalies. For example,
the oldest known and most ubiquitous of
toxic compounds, lead, is excluded from
the list and its addition is affirmatively
barred by the new law. Section
11 2(b)(7) states that "[tihe Administrator
may not list elemental lead as a
hazardous air pollutant under this
subsection." 7 Additionally, during the
course of considering the legislation,
Congress removed two chemicals,
ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, that were
included on the original list.9" Ammonia
is used extensively- in the fertilizer
industry, while hydrogen sulfide is a
byproduct of oil and gas drilling
operations as well as pulp and paper
mills.
By removing - or, in the case of lead,
barring - these substances from the list,
the Congress assured that the public
would be inadequately protected from
these toxic materials. Emissions from
secondary lead smelters operating in the
Los Angeles Basin of Southern California,
for example, are reportedly causing the
region to exceed the NAAQS. To
regulate lead emissions, local officials
must now rely on the relatively
cumbersome processes contained in the
non-attainment provisions of federal law
or on their own state laws.
V. TITLE IV: ACID DEPOSITION
CONTROLS
The area in which Congress Is most
widely perceived as having strengthened
the underlying Clean Air Act through the
1990 amendments is in the provisions
addressing acid deposition. Yet, as in so
many other areas, the Title IV
amendments eliminated provisions that
had been widely regarded as key
elements of the 1970 Act, substituting
troubling new concepts. Several
examples are worthy of note. First, air
pollution was characterized - and was
arguably established - as a "right" for
the first time. These provisions are
contained in Title I, but were Included
there as predicates for the operation of
the trading scheme established in Title
IV.90 (Although the establishment of
pollution as a right was justified as a
predicate for the trading scheme of the
acid deposition title, one of the first
proposed applications of trading has been
in the context of ozone nonattainment in
the nation's most polluted region, Los
Angeles. The South Coast Air Quality
Management District's Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market ("RECLAIM") program
announced in early 1992 is described as
a "bold departure from traditional
command and control regulations,"
allowing trades of reactive organic gases
and oxides of nitrogen.)
Second, the groundwork was laid for
the administrative repeal of the so-called
WEPCO decision, which created an
uproar in the utility industry when it was
announced.1" WEPCO was a decision
by the EPA Administrator that required
electric power plants being repowered to
comply with the Act's performance
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standards for new sources. Had the
WEPCO decision been allowed to remain
in effect, the reductions in emissions of
sulfur dioxide would likely have reached
14 million tons - considerably more than
the 10 million ton reduction the 1990
amendments supposedly will achieve.' 0 '
Third, western and other so-called
"clean" states with emission rates below
the national average were allowed to
increase their total emissions.'0 2 And
fourth, the "percentage reduction"
requirement, which mandated the
installation of a technological system of
control without regard to the sulfur
content of the coal being burned, was
repealed.
A. Background
Acid deposition was the only major
subject of the 1990 amendments that
had not been explicitly addressed by pre-
existing law. However, Senate floor
amendments dealing with acid deposition
had been offered as early as 1980, and
full-blown control programs had been
proposed in the early 1980s.1'
Atmospheric acids are created when
certain pollutants, especially sulphur
dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, are
oxidized in the air to form sulfates,
nitrates and acidic compounds. These
can fall to earth in either dry or wet
forms and, if wet, as either fog, rain or
snow. 1' 4 Acid deposition was widely
believed to be the cause of acidified lakes
and streams, forest dieback and death,
and a variety of other environmental
damage. r
Although acid deposition was not
specifically addressed by the 1970 Act or
its 1977 amendments, there were several
provisions of pre-existing law that could
have been invoked to curb the emissions
that cause it.' Indeed, an argument
can be made that the primary reasons
Congress found it necessary to address
acid deposition directly (or, for that
matter, nonattainment, hazardous air
pollutants, tighter tailpipe standards and
the vast majority of other matters that
were subjects of the 1990
amendments) 0 7 were the malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance of Reagan-
Bush agency appointees.
B. The 1990 Amendments
The primary objective of the acid
deposition title is described as achieving
a 10 million ton reduction in emissions of
sulfur dioxide from 1980 levels. These
reductions are to be achieved in two
phases. The first phase, which is
expected to achieve an annual reduction
of about 5 million tons of sulfur dioxide
from 1980 levels, is the equivalent of an
average emissions rate of 2.5 pounds of
S0 2 per million BTU of energy input.10o
The second phase, expected to achieve
an additional 5 million ton reduction by
January 1, 2000, requires the equivalent
of a 1.2 average emissions rate.'00 To
maximize the economic efficiency with
which these reductions are achieved, the
1990 amendments rely on a novel
mechanism. Emissions of sulfur dioxide
are allocated among the states and their
sources, which are then allowed to trade
them, essentially at will, like stocks and
bonds."' Rather than relying on the
technology-forcing approach of the 1970
law, the 1990 amendments allow
sources to achieve assigned reductions
however they wish: by switching to
lower-sulfur fuels, installing pollution
control devices, or replacing existing
combustion systems with intrinsically
less-polluting mechanisms. However,
each of the overall averages could be met
exclusively through the use of low-sulfur
coals without resort to more highly
efficient or less polluting
technologies."'
To provide for the adoption of new
technologies, the acid deposition title
allows two benefits for a source that is
"repowering" (that is, replacing existing
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coal-fired boilers with a new technology
such as pressurized fluidized bed
combustion):" 2 (1) an extension of the
final compliance date from January 1,
2000, to December 31, 2003,"11 thus
creating the possibility that the acid
deposition control program will actually
require a total of fourteen years for full
implementation rather than ten; and (2)
an exemption from the law's new source
performance standards. 1 '
1. New Source Standards and Review
By exempting repowered sources
from compliance with the New Source
Performance Standards (*NSPS"), the
amendments effectively preclude the
possibility that emissions limits (or overall
efficiency) of the source will be improved
by regulation. Thus, these technologies
will improve at a pace dictated by the
industries, and will not be forced by
external regulation. In addition to
removing the NSPS as a way to force
technology, the Congress tacitly agreed
to allow a recision of the decision by the
Environmental Protection Agency in the
WEPCO case.11
2. WEPCO
The Wisconsin Electric Power
Company ("WEPCO") decided to upgrade
several coal-fired units it operated in Port
Washington, Wisconsin." 6 Under prior
EPA rules, such upgrades would trigger
new source review under the Clean Air
Act only if there were a total actual
emissions increase or if the capital cost
of replacing component parts totaled
more than fifty percent of the cost of a
new plant. However, even though the
WEPCO repowering violated neither of
these criteria, EPA held that since its
capacity - and hence its hourly
emissions - would increase after the
repowering, the reconstruction would
nevertheless be subject to new source
standards and review. The effect of
WEPCO was to trigger a panoply of Clean
Air Act requirements ranging from the
NSPS to Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) review." 7
The WEPCO decision sent shudders
through the power industry because the
bulk of US power plant units would soon
be in the same position as those In
dispute at WEPCO. According to a 1987
report of the US Department of Energy,
"the average system age is approaching
25 years. Typically, 30 to 40 years is
the usual retirement age for power
plants."" 8  Thus, the effect of
WEPCO was to subject virtually all power
plants to new source review - and
emission limits - within roughly the
same time frame as that covered by Title
IV of the 1990 amendments. Triggering
new source standards, however, would
reduce annual emissions of sulfur dioxide
by 12 million tons or more, compared to
the 10 million ton decrease of the 1990
amendments." 9
In addition, since power plants would
be subject to review for emissions of
other pollutants, e.g., NO x, reductions in
these pollutants could be expected as
well. For example, when Germany
upgraded all of its power plants in the
five year period 1983-88, the result was
an efficiency increase of about twelve
percent, with a corresponding reduction
in emissions of carbon dioxide.'
3. Repeal of "Percent Reduction"
Section 111(a)(1)(A), which was
added by the 1977 amendments,
required fossil-fuel fired stationary
sources, which are primarily power plants
and industrial boilers, to achieve a
"percentage reduction in the emissions
from such category of sources from the
emissions which would have resulted
from the use of fuels which are not
subject to treatment prior to
combustion."' 2' This provision had
been widely criticized as a special interest
amendment, added to protect high-sulfur
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coal producers and miners. 12  No
doubt it had such an effect. However, it
also effectively required that such large
power stations rely on more than fuel-
switching alone to reduce emissions.
Because a "percentage reduction" was
required, without regard to the quality of
the fuel, technological deployment was
an inevitable and unavoidable
consequence of this provision, 12 3
which explains its wide support by
environmental organizations.
Thus, regardless of the motives of the
authors of the percentage reduction
requirement, its effect was to spur the
development of a wide variety of
pollution control technologies, ranging
from scrubbers to coal cleaning, and
including new methods of combustion
that are inherently more efficient and less
polluting.12 4 Percentage reduction was
repealed at the behest of western
senators for the express purpose of
encouraging the use of the so-called
"clean" (that is, lower-sulfur) coals 26
that are found throughout that region.
Because lower-sulfur coals can meet the
2.5 and 1.2 pound per million BTU
requirements of the 1990
amendments 2 1 without pre- or post-
treatment technologies or combustion
modifications, the demand for these coals
is expected to be stimulated by the acid
rain control program.
Parochial considerations of this sort run
throughout Title IV. There are special
provisions for narrowly described
units, 12 7  alternative allowance
allocations,125 and "bonus" pollution
allowances.
12
VI. OTHER TITLES
The 1990 amendments contain seven
other titles,1 0 most of which deserve
more extensive treatment than space
here allows. Especially noteworthy,
however, are the following,
A. Stratospheric Ozone Depletion
Title VI of the 1990 amendments
establishes a detailed and comprehensive'
program to regulate production and use
of chemicals that destroy stratospheric
ozone. It exceeds in stringency the major
international agreement on the subject,
the Montreal Protocol,1 1 and appears
to place the United States on a path to
rapidly reduce levels of chemicals that
destroy the ozone shield. Yet again, the
amendments fall short of their promise.
Title VI repeals sections 151 through
159 of the pre-existing law, which
included an unusually broad grant of
authority to the Administrator:
If... in the Administrator's judgment,
any substance, practice, process or
activity may reasonably be anticipated
to affect the stratosphere, especially
ozone in the stratosphere, and such
affect may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare, the
Administrator shall promptly
promulgate regulations respecting the
control of such substance, practice,
process or activity .... "I
In explaining this language, Sen.
Muskie, chairman of the Senate
conferees, said, "[this section assures
that there is adequate federal authority to
prevent all actual or potential risks to the
stratosphere." The Administrator of the
EPA, said Muskie, "should take any
necessary steps within his authority to
reduce or eliminate such risk.""
The sweeping grant of power
contained in the 1977 amendments was
reenacted verbatim by the 1990
amendments. In addition, the title
establishes phaseouts for certain classes
of ozone destroying chemicals such as
the chlorine-based CFCs. Ozone
destroyers with the longest atmospheric
lifetimes are grouped in "Class I" while
those with shorter lives are grouped into
"Class I1." Production of most Class I
substances must cease by January 1,
2000.134 A phaseout of Class II
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substances begins in the year 2015,
when production is limited to the level of
a baseline year to be selected by the
Administrator, and concludes in the year
2030.136 The Administrator is
authorized to accelerate these timetables
if a more stringent schedule (a) is
necessary to protect human health and
the environment, (b) is practicable, based
on the availability of substitutes, or (c) is
required by a revision of the Montreal
Protocol. 138
Several observations should be made
regarding this timetable. First, there is
widespread agreement within the
scientific community that so-called
"heterogenous chemistry," which is
characterized by extraordinarily rapid
change and is thus difficult to predict
with current knowledge, is responsible
for the Antarctic ozone hole. Substantial
evidence exists now, as it did at the time
of the enactment of the 1990
amendments, that heterogenous
chemistry accounts for comparable
"holes" in Arctic regions, as well as
substantial wintertime losses in the
Earth's northern latitudes. Because
heterogenous chemistry is incompletely
understood, scientists are unable to
define any "safe" level of ozone-
destroying compounds in the
atmosphere.
Second, although Class II substances,
which are often referred to as "HCFCs"
because they contain a hydrogen atom,
have shorter atmospheric lifetimes than
CFCs (which contain no hydrogen), they
nevertheless destroy large quantities of
ozone while they are still "alive."
Measured over a time frame of 150
years, a particular HCFC may have only
1/20th the ozone-destroying potential of
a CFC; however, measured over the first
twenty years, the ozone-destruction
potential of a given HCFC may be half
that of a CFC. Thus, if the object is to
sharply reduce total chlorine loading of
the atmosphere over the next twenty
years - rather than in the twenty-second
and twenty-third centuries - prompt
reductions in the use of HCFCs is
essential. The 1990 amendments,
however, not only place no limit on the
production of HCFCs, but implicitly
encourage expanded production and use,
perhaps for as long as a quarter-century.
Thus, at least in theory, near-term
concentrations of chlorine - and
resulting ozone destruction - might
actually increase rather than
decrease.13
7
However imprudent a forty-year
phaseout of HCFCs might be in terms of
the global environment, it is the time
frame that was sought by the chemical
industry1 38 and granted by Congress.
B. Pollution Pork Barrel: Serving
Narrow or Special Interests
Sprinkled liberally throughout the
1990 amendments are provisions
according special treatment to particular
industries or areas.
0 Section 184(b)(1)(A) requires
improved vehicular I&M programs In
states that are included in the eleven-
state Ozone Transport Region.
Metropolitan statistical areas or parts
thereof with a population of less than
100,000 are exempted. Among the
areas covered by this provision Is
Queen Anne County, Maryland, which
was represented on the Senate
Committee from 1987-88 by Senator
Barbara Mikulski (D-MD). One
adjoining state, Virginia, is excluded
from the Region (except for those
portions included in the Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Area of the
District of Columbia), even though its
three largest metropolitan areas were
all nonattainment for ozone.
1 39
Virginia's senior Senator, John Warner
(R-VA), was also a member of the
Senate Committee.
f'I t~hN AID AfT AIACWIrRtPrI"D
9 Several western states, including
North Dakota, Montana and Wyoming,
were authorized by section 406 to
increase emissions of air pollutants "as
an attempt to recognize past efforts"
on their part."4  The three states
were represented on the Senate
Committee by Senators Quentin
Burdick (D-ND), Max Baucus (D-MT),
and Alan Simpson (R-WY),
respectively.
0 The allowance system established by
the acid deposition title creates
pollution rights that will presumably be
worth a great deal of money. Under
section 405(a)(2), some plants are
awarded "bonus" pollution
allowances. 141  In addition, plants
located in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,
Georgia, Alabama, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky
and Tennessee are granted pro rata
shares of another 50,000 tons of sulfur
dioxide emissions by section
405(a)(3).1 42  Other than Missouri,
Kentucky and West Virginia, each state
was represented on the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce.
0 Other special benefits are granted by
the 1990 amendments on the basis of
the activity, rather than location.
Under section 410(h), for example,
small diesel refineries are to receive
pollution allowances."4
* Oil wells are another special interest.
Although other sources of toxic
pollution are subject to regulation under
Title Ill, oil and gas wells cannot be
listed as an area source category
unless they are located in a
metropolitan area with a population in
excess of one million. Nor can these
wells, their pipelines, compressors or
pumping stations be aggregated to
form a major source, and thus become
subject to regulation.'"
0 So-called "stripper wells" - that is,
oil and gas wells that utilize techniques
such as steam injection to enhance
their productivity - are exempted by
section 819 from a variety of the
changes made by the 1990
amendments.'
4 6
* Section 301(q)(2) prohibits
regulation under the 1990 amendments
of radionuclide emissions from
elemental phosphorous plants, grate
calcination elemental phosphorous
plants, phosphogypsum stacks, and
any subcategory of the foregoing.14
Instead, emissions from these facilities
are to be regulated as they were under
the previous law. And under section
301 (c)(8), separate standards must be
established for emissions of hazardous
air pollutants from boat manufacturing
operations. 47
Other provisions of the amendments
are mysteries: anomalous exceptions or
special treatment that cannot be readily
explained.'"
CONCLUSIONS
No doubt, the vast majority of the
individuals involved in the enactment of
the 1990 amendments genuinely believe
that they represent sound, responsible
public policy. Time may prove that
judgment to be correct.
However, time had already proven the
1970 Act to be a workable and effective
mechanism for reducing air pollution.
Most of the Act's perceived failures could
be tied directly to the fundamental
hostility of the Reagan and Bush
Administrations, as well as a few
powerful members of Congress, to
environmental protection. Instead of
exposing and confronting that hostility
and its consequences, the Congress
chose to repeal the very provisions of law
that Reagan and Bush appointees had
repeatedly refused to implement.
Given the current nature of the
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Congress and the pivotal positions
occupied by individuals such as
Representative John Dingell (R-MI),
chairman of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, and other
opponents of environmental protection,
this decision is understandable.
Doubtless, whatever their failings, the
1990 amendments were the best law
that could be enacted under the
circumstances of 1989-90. That does
not, however, justify misrepresentation of
the amendments. Representative Dingell
and his allies, including President Bush,
deserve the' credit for their legislative
successes, and the American people
deserve the truth.
If the establishment of pollution as a
right for polluters, the repeal of deadlines
for achieving healthy air and the
continued production of ozone-destroying
chemicals ultimately produce an
environment and economy that are
sounder, then those who proposed these
changes deserve the accolades they no
doubt would receive. However, if these
changes have the opposite effect and
escalate the toll in terms of the human
suffering and environmental injury
inflicted by air pollutants, those who
advocated these changes deserve the
opprobrium that would certainly greet
them. Only time, and honesty, will tell
that tale.
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view of the EPA that section 112 did not
mandate zero emissions. The National
Commission on Air Quality, a select
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review air pollution regulation in the United
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Mhe agency stated that a
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would produce massive social
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at least minimal levels of carcinogenic
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utilities, steel, synthetic organic
chemical manufacturing, and petroleum
refining.
The agency analysis, which concludes
that Congress did not intend a zero
emissions requirement, argues that
Congress in writing Section 112 made an
underlying assumption of thresholds for
effects from pollutants. The agency
contends that the drastic consequences
of applying a strict reading of the statute
to carcinogens, for which there is no
known threshold, was not contemplated
by Congress. It maintains there is no
reason to believe Congress intended to
make air pollution "practically the sole
facet of American life" from which the
government would attempt to eliminate
risk entirely ....
Nati Commission on Air Quality, To Breathe
Clean Air 3.1-20 (1981).
69. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Hearings an HR 2585 before the
Subcommittee on Health & the Envir of the
Committee on Energy & Commerce, 101st
Cong, 2d Sess 295 (1990) (statement of
David Doniger, NRDC) ("1990 Amendment
Hearings"). The eight regulated pollutants
were arsenic, asbestos, benzene, beryllium,
mercury, radionuclides, radon-222, and vinyl
chloride.
70. Id at 580 (statement of William K. Reilly,
EPA Administrator).
71. The remaining five sections deal with -
0 Conforming amendments. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 at 1 302, 104 Stat at
2574, 42 USCA § 7411;
a A Risk Assessment and Management
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and report to the President and the Congress
within 48 months after enactment. Id at §
303, 104 Stat ai 2574, 42 USCA § 7412;
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act under the Occupational Health and Safety
Act to protect workers from accidental
releases of chemicals. Occupational Health
and Safety Act § 304, 29 USCA § 655 note
95 (1988);
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standards for emissions for municipal solid
waste combusters. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 at § 305, 104 Stat at
2578, 42 USCA § 7429;
* A two-year ban on the regulation of ash
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72. The amendments focus on two different
sources of toxic compounds: (1) large, fixed
installations such as refineries, printing plants
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104 Stat at 2531, 42 USCA § 7412(a)(1).
"Area sources" include everything else that
emits hazardous pollutants and does not
move. Id at § 112(a)(2), 104 Stat at 2531,
42 USCA § 7412(a)(2) ("any stationary
source of hazardous air pollutants that Is not
a major source").
The technology standard for area sources is
even more lenient than that for major sources:
for them, the Administrator may "provide for
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Id at § 11 2(d)(5), 104 Stat at 2540,42 USCA
§ 7412(d)(5).
73. 1990 Amendment Hearings at 580
(statement of William K. Reilly, EPA
Administrator) (cited in note 69).
74. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 at
§ 112(d)(2), 104 Stat at 2539, 42 USCA
§ 7412(d)(2) (emphasis added).
75. 33 USC § 1317(a)(2) (1988).
76. Michael Weisskopf, EPA to Put Federal
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Wash Post A2 (Feb 1, 1992).
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ovens. In its 1987 report accompanying
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Senate Committee said the coke oven
proposals -
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Clean Air Standards Attainment Act of 1987,
S Rep No 100-231, 100th Cong, 1st Sess
240 (1987).
78. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 at
§ 11 2(d)(3)(A), 104 Stat at 2543, 42 USCA
§ 7412(d)(3)(A). This program contrasts
sharply with the technology-based programs
of some other nations. In Germany, for
example, the standards for both new and
existing sources are based on what the
government terms a "dynamic state-of-the-
art" which requires a level of emissions for all
sources once it has been achieved by even
one facility.
79. Id at § 112(f)(2)(A), 104 Stat at 2543,
42 USCA § 7412(f)(2)(A).
80. NRDC v EPA, 824 F2d 1146, 1154-55
(DC Cir 1987).
81. To Breathe Clean Air at 3.1-20 (cited in
note 68).
82. Vinyl Chloride, 824 F2d at 1164-65.
83. Id at 1165.
84. The Statement of Managers explains that
establishing a standard based on protecting
human health Is a two-step process:
In the first step of this analysis, the
Administrator must determine a safe or
acceptable level of risk considering only
health factors. In the second step, the
Administrator may consider cost,
feasibility and other relevant factors in
addition to health In order to set a
standard to provide an "ample margin of
safety.
Conference Report at 337 (cited in note 50).
This approach is required under the Wnyl
Chloride decision. It seems prudent to reserve
the question of exactly what action the
Congress took for possible later resolution by
a court. The Conference Report avoids a
direct statement adopting the holding of Wnyl
Chloride, saying Instead that a two-step
approach "is required under the decision of
the U.S. Court of Appeals." Id. Presumably,
if Vinyl Chloride were judicially revisited, there
would be room to construe the statutory
language differently - both old and new.
85. 3 CFR Comp 127 (1981), In 5 USC §
601 (1988) (EO signed on Feb 17, 1981).
See also Erik D. Olsen, The Quiet Shift of
Power, 4 Va J Nat Res.L 1 (1984).
86. 3 CFR 323 (1986), in 5 USC § 601
(1988). For a summary of EOs 12498 &
12291, see Staff of Subcommittee on Toxic
Substances & Envir Oversight of the Senate
Committee on Envir & Public Works, Office of
Management & Budget Influence on Agency
Regulations, 99th Cong, 2d Sess (1986)
(Comm Print No 99-156) ('OMB Influence").
87. 3 CFR 554 (1988), in 5 USC § 601
(1988).
88. Letter from Lee M. Thomas, EPA
Administrator, to Sen. Uoyd Bentsen (D-TX)
(Apr 26, 1985).
52 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
89. Id.
90. OMB Influence at 30 (cited in note 86).
For a discussion of the application of
"sunshine" requirements to OMB, see id at
13-18. See also Curtis Moore, Watchdog on
a Choke Chain, TDC Magazine 16 (Sept
1991).
91. See also Roger J. Marzulla, The New
Takings Executive Order and Environmental
Regulation: Collision or Cooperation?, 18 ELR
10254 (1988); James M. McEifish, The
Takings Executive Order: Constitutional
Jurisprudence or Political Philosophy?, 18 ELR
10474 (1988).
92. EO No 12630, in 3 CFR 554 (cited in
note 87).
93. See note 72 for these central definitions.
94. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 at §
112(a)(8), 104 Stat at 2532, 42 USCA §
7412(a)(8).
95. See, for example, Controlling Alrbome
Particles 38-60 (1980) (prepared by
Committee on Particulate Control Technology,
Envir Studies Bd, Commission on Natural
Resources, Natl Research Council, Natl
Academy of Sciences).
The treatment of powerplant emissions by
the 1990 Amendments exemplifies the
manner in which the new law holds out
regulatory hopes which may ultimately prove
to be false.
The Report of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, which
accompanied Its version of the 1990
Amendments, cited the failure of EPA to
regulate powerplant mercury emissions as an
example of the inadequacy of the old law and,
presumably, an evil which would be cured by
the 1990 amendments:
In the 18 years of administering
section 112, EPA has listed only-8
pollutants: mercury, beryllium,
asbestos, vinyl chloride, benzene,
radionuclides, inorganic arsenic, and
coke oven emissions. No standard has
been promulgated for coke oven
emissions and for many of the other
pollutants[;J only a few of the source
categories emitting the substance
are actually regulated. For instance,
mercury is a listed substance, but
mercury emissions from powerplant
boilers (exempt from standards) are
contributing to high mercury levels
in the flesh of fish taken In the
Great Lakes region.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, S Rep
No 101-228, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 131
(1989) (emphasis added).
However, under the 1990 Amendments,
mercury emissions from powerplants can be
regulated under the new law only after the
completion of a study required by § 112(n).
The study must be completed within 3 years
of the date of enactment, after which "itihe
Administrator shall regulate electric utility
steam generating units under this section, if
the Administrator finds such regulation is
appropriate and necessary after considering
the results of the study required by this
subparagraph." Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 at § 112(n), 104 Stat at 2558-59, 42
USCA § 7412(n)(3).
Under prior law, standards established by
regulations under section 112 would have
been issued solely on the basis of protection
of human health and would not have taken
into account the size of the source. Under the
new law, however, standards must, under
section 11 2(d)(2), be set taking into account
"the cost of achieving such emission
reduction and any nonair quality health and
environmental impacts and energy
requirements." Also, no individual powerplant
is likely to qualify as a "major source."
Therefore, powerplants will likely be treated
as "area sources," which under section
112(c)(3) are to be regulated with priority
given to those sources "that present the
greatest threat to public health in the largest
number of urban areas." Finally, any such
regulations must comply with E~s 12291,
12498 and 12630.
Thus, although regulation of mercury
emissions from powerplants was one of the
cited justifications for repeal of section 112 of
the prior law,the 1990 Amendments explicitly
prohibit such controls until completion of a
study as well as the issuance of findings
based on it. Implicitly, any regulations must
be based on a cost-benefit analysis and
otherwise be consistent with the
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Regulation of mercury emissions from
powerplants is by no means a certainty.
Should standards be promulgated, they must
take Into account not only cost, but
technological achievabllity as well. Protection
of human health, the predicate of prior law,
plays a vague role in the standard-setting
process, if any.
96. The list is based on a list of 191
chemicals compiled by the Environmental
Protection Agency and contained in the
proposals submitted by the Bush
Administration. Pollutants may be added if
they "present, or may present, through
inhalation or other routes of exposure, a
threat of adverse human health effects
(including, but not limited to, substances
which are known to be, or may reasonably be
anticipated to be, carcinogenic, mutagenic,
teratogenic, neurotoxic, which cause
reproductive dysfunction, or which are acutely
or chronically toxic) or adverse environmental
effects ... ." Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 at § 112(b)(2), 104 Stat at 2535, 42
USCA § 7412(b)(2). Substances may also be
removed from the list by the Administrator. Id
at§ 112(b)(3), 104 Stat at 2536,42 USCA §
7412(b)(3).
97. Id at § 11 2(b)(7), 104 Stat at 2537, 42
USCA § 7412(b)(7). Lead, associated with
the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, has
been described by one scholar as follows:
"mhe mining and smelting of lead and
dispersal of manufactured leaded products
within the human environment Is actually a
monumental crime committed by humanity
against humanity itself."
Clair C. Patterson, An Alternative Perspective:
Lead Pollution In the Human Environment -
Origin, Extent and Significance, in Lead in the
Human Environment (1980) (report of the
Committee on Lead in the Human
Environment, Envir Studies Bd, Commission
on Natural Resources, Nat] Research Council,
Nat Academy of Sciences).
98. Interestingly, although the Conferees
reached agreement to delete ammonia and
hydrogen sulfide, and the Conference Report
reflects this accord, because of an error the
enrolled bill - which is the actual statute -
still included hydrogen sulfide. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 at § 112(b)(1), 104
Stat at 2534, 42 USCA § 7412(b)(1).
99. Id at § 403(f), 104 Stat at 2591-92, 42
USCA § 7651b(f).
100. Wisconsin Electric Power Co v EPA, 893
F2d 901 (7th Cir 1990).
101. See Curbing Acid Rain: Cost, Budget
and Coal-Market Effects (1986) (prepared by
Cong Budget Ofc).
102. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 at
§ 406(a), 104 Stat at 2613, 42 USCA §
7651e(a).
103. Acid Deposition, Hearings on S 1706, S
1709, & S 1718 before the Senate
Committee on Envir & Public Works, 97th
Cong, 1st Sess 763-87 (1982).
104. Acid Rain and Transported Pollutants:
Implications for Public Policy 274 (June 1984)
(prepared by Ofc of Technology Assessment,
US Cong) (OTA No OTA-0-204) ("Transported
Pollutants").
105. See, for example, Robert H. Boyle, An
American Tragedy, Sports llus 68, 70 (Sept
21, 1981).
106. Provisions of pre-existing law which
could have been more fully implemented to
address acid rain Included:
0 Thetransboundary provisions of sections
115 and 126, which could have been
implemented to allow states and other nations
adversely impacted by acid rain to obtain
redress from emitting jurisdictions. Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977 at §§ 115(b) &
126, 91 Stat at 710 & 724, 42 USC §§
7415(b) & 7426;
* The primary ambient standards
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TABLE I
OZONE SMOG REQUIREMENTS*
The amendments set six deadline categories for ozone nonattainment areas, based
on air quality, expressed as the EPA "design value" (essentially the fourth most
unhealthy ozone day in the previous three years):
Design value
(parts per million)-
0.121 to 0.138
1.138 to 0.160
0.160 to 0.180
0.180 to 0.280
0.280 and above
Attainment Deadlines
(fromnnectmnt)
3 years
6 years
9 years
15 years
20 years
'Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 at § 181 (a), 104 Stat at 2423, 42 USCA§ 7511 (a) (1).
CARBON MONOXIDE REQUIREMENTS*
The nation's 41 carbon monoxide nonattainment areas (as of 1989) are divided into
two categories, based on the severity of the problem, according to the following table.
Design Value
(parts per million)
9.1 to 16.4
16.5 and above
Attainment Deadline
(from enactment)
December 31, 1995
December 31, 2000
'Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 at § 186(a)(1), 104 Stat at 2452, 42 USCA
§ 7512(a)(1).
Marginal
Moderate
Serious
Severe
Extreme
Moderate
Serious
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TABLE II
TIER I FEDERAL LIGHT DUTY STANDARDS
VERSUS THE CURRENT CALIFORNIA PROGRAM
Total HC** Carbon Monoxide NitrogenOxIdes
Current 0.41 3.4 1.0
Federal
(50,000 mi,
certification and
in-use)
NMHC**
Tier I
1994-8*
50,000 mi: 0.25** 3.4 0.4
100,000 mi: 0.31 4.2 0.5
Tier 11 0.125 1.7 0.2
"Pending!
California
1993 0.25 3.4 0.4
TLEV•**(1994) 0.125 3.4 0.4
LEV (1997) 0.075 3.4 0.2
ULEV (1997) 0.04 1.7 0.2
ZEV (1998) Zero Tailpipe
* Certification only phased in 1994-6; phased in for purposes of in-use compliance
between 1996 and 1998, with no recall testing allowed past 75,000 miles.
Standards are expressed as "nonmethane hydrocarbons." Expressed as a "total
hydrocarbon" standard, the figures would be approximately 0.31 and 0.39.
* TLEV = Transitional Low Emission Vehicle
LEV = Low Emission Vehicle
ULEV = Ultra Low Emission Vehicle
ZEV = Zero Tailpipe Emissions Vehicle
The standards are phased in, beginning in 1994 for TLEV; 1997 for LEV and ULEV;
and 1998 for ZEV. CARB estimates that by 2000, every car sold in California will
meet the LEV standard or better. By 2003 - when the Tier II standards first become
a possibility at the federal level - new car sales in California are expected to be
seventy-five percent LEV, fifteen percent ULEV, and ten percent ZEV.
